Mali

Resilient growth despite mining and security challenges

Growth slowed significantly in 2025 due to a deterioration in the security situation. Added to fuel supply disruptions and the impact on electricity production, it contributed to the collapse of gold mining in 2025 (-23% in volume, y-o-y). The setback prevented Mali from taking full advantage of the rise in global gold prices. The sector has been also disrupted by tax disputes since the reform of the mining code in 2023, allowing the state to hold 30% of mining projects, compared with 20% previously. After the tax dispute between the state and Canadian mining group Barrick led to the shutdown of production at the Loulo-Gounkoto gold mine (the country's largest mine, accounting for 35% of national production) in January 2025, the parties announced a financial settlement in November, suggesting a full resumption of operations in Q1 2026. However, the operating permit for one of the mine’s two sites is due to expire in February 2026. The tertiary sector (particularly telecommunications) and food crop farming have proved resilient, offsetting a slight decline in the 2024-2025 cotton harvest following the floods of 2024.

Growth is expected to rebound in 2026, boosted by the recovery in gold production and the boom in lithium extraction, with the opening of a second mine in Bougouni in 2025, following the opening of the Goulamina mine the previous year. Both mines are operated by Chinese groups, respectively Hainan Mining and Ganfeng. However, power failures will continue to hamper activity, together with high cost of electricity (the highest in the region, at 130 CFA francs/kWh) and the fragile financial situation of Électricité du Mali (EDM). The perilous security situation is also putting significant pressure on oil supplies (oil accounts for 60% of the national electricity mix). In addition, the 2025-2026 cotton harvest is expected to decline sharply (-34% in volume) after a year marked by insufficient rainfall. Inflation, which already slowed in 2025, is expected to decline further in 2026 thanks to lower food and energy prices. Despite regulated prices, fuel supply challenges nevertheless pose an inflationary risk on the parallel market.

Mali withdrew from ECOWAS in 2025 but is still a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). Despite official hostility toward the West African monetary system, an exit from the Union remains highly unlikely. Mali continues to rely on the regional market for financing and benefits from the monetary stability provided by the CFA franc. The government has recently denied any plans to introduce a common currency for the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). The gap between ECB and BCEAO policy rates (2% and 3.25%, respectively) supports the rebuilding of regional foreignexchange reserves and creates room for monetary easing, while regional inflation is expected to fall well below the 3% target from 2025 onward. A 25basispoint cut in BCEAO rates therefore appears likely in 2026.

Slimmer budget deficit but the situation depends on regional financing

Following the increase in the public deficit in 2025, the draft finance bill for 2026 provides for fiscal consolidation focused on reducing current expenditure, notably a freeze on wage costs, but also on the non-renewal of exceptional military expenditure engaged in 2025 (-15% y-o-y) related to equipment acquisitions. On the revenue side, Mali will benefit from the recovery in gold production and an increase in the sector's tax revenue due to the new mining code, which is now enforced by all producers. The debt ratio fell slightly in 2025 and the trend is set to continue in 2026 thanks to dynamic growth. However, the liquidity risk is large. The majority of public debt (58%) is denominated in CFA francs, highlighting the country's dependence on domestic banks and the WAEMU financial market. The debt consists mainly of high-cost bonds (9.5% on 3-year OATs in December 2025) with short and medium maturities. In 2026, total maturities will amount to CFAF 1,400 billion (10% of GDP), mainly owed to domestic lenders. The bunching of maturities (62% in less than three years) poses a refinancing risk that could exacerbate the already sizable arrears to domestic creditors (2.5% of GDP, compared with 0.7% to external creditors). Extra-regional public debt (27% of GDP) carries lower risk. It benefits from longer maturities and preferential terms, as two-thirds of it is held by the IMF and the African Development Fund (ADF). Following the floods of 2024, the IMF disbursed USD 129 million and set up a Staff Monitored Program (SMP).

The current account deficit widened slightly in 2025 due to a sharp increase in imports and a reduction in US aid (-50% of total aid y-o-y). In 2026, it should improve, driven by a contraction of the trade deficit. It will benefit from the recovery in gold production and improved terms of trade, particularly lower energy and food prices (40% and 10% of imports, respectively). However, logistical difficulties will persist, and the cost of freight and insurance (70% of imported services) will continue to weigh heavily on the current account. Remittances from expatriates will offset the repatriation of profits by foreign companies, which are down in the mining sector due to the new legislation. Tax disputes and insecurity are unlikely to deter investment in this sector, as the gold resource potential remains significant, while prices are expected to remain high in 2026. FDI and WAEMU regional credit flows will finance most of the balance of payments deficit.

General Assimi Goïta, who has led the military regime established after the 2020 and 2021 coups, further consolidated his power in 2025. The return to constitutional order, initially planned for March 2024, was delayed indefinitely and political parties were dissolved in May 2025. In July, the National Transition Council (CNT)—a legislative body appointed by decree—granted him a fiveyear term with unlimited renewals, making elections unlikely in the medium term. Beyond the Islamist insurgency, the main threat to the regime comes from the army: the crackdown on dissidents and the state’s failure to ensure security have exposed internal rivalries. A failed coup in August 2025, followed by the arrest of several senior officers, including two generals, highlight growing tensions within the regime.

The security situation worsened in 2025. Clashes with jihadist militants from the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) spread to the south and west of the country. These regions, which had previously been relatively spared from incursions, form the economic heart of the nation. The Sikasso region in the south and the Kayes region in the west host most of the country’s gold mines (31% and 65% of production, respectively) as well as its main agricultural potential. They are also crossed by the main road corridors connecting Bamako to the Senegalese and Ivorian ports, through which most trade transits. Intensified attacks along these routes led to a partial blockade of the capital in September 2025 when insurgents targeted its fuel supplies. Although the pressure eased after December, these routes were still subject to attacks in February 2026. The number of casualties in the conflict remained stable in 2025 (2,000 to 3,000 deaths) due to a decline in attacks in the central and northern regions. However, these areas are far from stable. Nationwide, the number of kidnappings of foreign nationals rose sharply (30 in 2025 compared with 7 between 2022 and 2024), as did attacks on banks and industrial sites, while JNIM sought to strengthen its territorial and financial base. The Islamic State in the Sahel, active in the tri-border area, also carried out sporadic attacks. In 2026, the conflict is expected to become entrenched in the areas where JNIM has advanced and a rapid stabilisation of the area appears unlikely despite large-scale deliveries of Russian and Turkish military equipment in January 2026. The overstretching of the Malian army and its allied military or paramilitary groups (Russian forces, Dozo militias), along with the abuses they are accused of, further undermine the junta’s credibility in rural areas. In the Saharan north, the Tuareg independence movement has been undergoing reorganisation since Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) retook Kidal in late 2023. Although the conflict has temporarily subsided, hostilities could quickly resume.

At the regional level, cooperation with Niger and Burkina Faso within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) has strengthened, with the December 2025 announcement of the creation of a 5,000strong military force, a development bank, and joint media outlets. The withdrawal of the three countries from ECOWAS became effective in January 2025 and was followed by the announcement of their intention to leave the International Criminal Court (ICC). Oil supplies from Niger, imported at preferential rates, play a critical role for Mali’s energy security, as its traditional supplies from the coast have been disrupted. Conversely, relations with ECOWAS remain tense, despite attempts to normalise ties following the official lifting of sanctions against Mali by the WAEMU Court in January 2026. The sanctions had not been enforced since June 2022. Seeking to reduce trade dependence on Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, Mali obtained logistical facilities at the Guinean port of Conakry. The year 2025 also saw a deterioration in relations with Algeria, accused of sheltering opposition figures, and border skirmishes occurred. The spillover of the conflict to the south—through incursions, recruitment of fighters, refugee flows, and attacks—is likely to fuel regional tensions, prompting Côte d’Ivoire to announce reinforced border controls. Internationally, ties with Russia, established after the expulsion of French and UN forces in 2022, continue to deepen through the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner), which plays a key role in Mali’s military apparatus. Concerned about the expansion of jihadism, the US is working to reestablish dialogue with the Malian authorities

Last updated:February 2026