Resilient domestic demand
Japan’s economic growth slowed in 2022 compared with 2021 as economic activity was affected by high commodity prices, supply-side constraints, and the impact of Covid-19. Private consumption (55% of GDP) and gross investment (25%) showed stronger recovery in the second half of 2022. Net exports however became an increasing drag on growth due to high import prices, a lack of tourism receipts linked to border restrictions and global trade slowdown. For 2022, Japan’s trade deficit (JPY 19.97 trillion) was the largest in over 40 years since 1979 as import value surged 74% y/y.
In the face of the global slowdown, Japan’s domestic demand will likely show resilience in 2023. Reopening momentum will continue to provide a boost to household consumption as voluntary cautiousness among consumers fades. The possibility of real wage growth turning positive on expected strong nominal increases following spring wage negotiations (shunt?), alongside a drawdown in excess household savings, estimated at 10% of GDP, will form additional tailwinds for consumer spending. The outcome of wage negotiations will also be a key factor behind monetary policy changes. Strong momentum in capital expenditure (capex) will also support the Japanese economy. Since mid-2022, corporate firms have started to raise capex significantly, with the September 2022 quarter seeing a 9.8% y/y rise. Data showed strong capex growth in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, such as production machinery, information and communication electrical equipment, construction, wholesale and retail trade, and services. Strong domestic demand for ongoing investment in sustainability, digital transformation, and solutions for alleviating manpower shortages, will underpin corporate capex in 2023.
Easing supply bottlenecks will support the recovery in industrial production, although the auto sector could continue to face some frictions in the supply of components, as highlighted by major car-makers, which will limit output. Waning external demand will be a major headwind to Japan’s GDP growth. A gradual normalisation of supply chains has aided Japan to grow its exports by 18% y/y in 2022, comparable to 22% rise in 2021.
Widening trade deficit
Weaker goods export performance, and resilient domestic demand, which should sustain strong import growth, could result in a wider trade deficit. However, current account balance should remain in surplus as the trade deficit will be more than offset by primary income surplus, reflecting strong income receipts coming from Japan’s overseas portfolio investment assets. Japan’s net international investment position (NIIP) has risen from 59.5% of GDP in 2017 to 70.7% by 2021, driven by outward FDI and portfolio outflows.
Combined budget requests for FY23 were at JPY 114.4 trillion (20% of GDP), up 6% from FY22’s JPY 107.6 trillion (19.1% of GDP), with debt-servicing at over one-fifth of the total, and social security spending at JPY 36.9 trillion (nearly one-third of total). Notably, Japan will hike its defence budget by over a quarter to JPY 6.8 trillion (1.2% of GDP) as part of a five-year programme to double defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2027 amid rising security challenges from North Korea and China. The final public spending tally is likely to be even higher since the government has routinely posted extra budgets each year since 2009, usually in the third or fourth quarter, which undermine fiscal consolidation efforts. In November 2022, the government announced a second supplementary budget worth JPY 29 trillion, where 80% would be financed through new bond issuances. This is expected to have taken total government bond issuances for FY22 to JPY 62.5 trillion. Continued government borrowings are projected to push the level of outstanding long-term debt to JPY 1,279 trillion (USD 10 trillion) or about 224% of Japan’s GDP. However, over 90% of long-term public debt is owned domestically, with the Bank of Japan holding just over half of outstanding debt after years of massive bond buying.
Moving towards policy normalisation
The Bank of Japan (BOJ)’s key inflation gauge, the core CPI (excluding fresh food), has kept above 2% since April 2022, and hit 4.1% in December 2022, the highest in over 41 years. This indicated a broadening of price pressures for a wider variety of goods and services. Furthermore, underlying inflation trend has been distorted by government policies such as the domestic travel subsidy programme and energy subsidies. Following the BOJ’s surprise move of a slight widening of the yield curve control (YCC) band to +/- 50bps in December, the central bank is likely to continue its gradual path of monetary policy normalisation, with more adjustments to the YCC, and negative interest rate policy (NIRP). There will also be a change of BOJ Governor in April. Although not our central scenario, a serious risk could emerge if Japan faces an unexpectedly rapid hike in inflation, prompting aggressive BOJ increases in short-term interest rates that could destabilise the domestic business environment that has long been used to very low borrowing rates, add to government’s debt payment pressures, and undermine financial stability.
Fading public support for the Kishida administration
The ruling coalition (Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito) controls 63% of the House of Representatives, and 58% of the House of Councillors, following the win in the upper house election soon after the assassination of former leader Shinzo Abe. However, support for Fumio Kishida’s government has plummeted to below 30% amid revelations about the longstanding ties between the LDP and the controversial Unification Church, and a series of forced ministerial departures due to scandal. Fading public support will make it more difficult for Kishida to keep the factious LDP in line, and navigate economic challenges, inflation and geopolitical tensions.